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Do Banks Have Private Information? 
Bank Screening and Ex-Post Firm Performance 
 
1.  Introduction 
Modern banking theory posits that banks have private information on 
borrowers’ creditworthiness and financial conditions, and that they utilize it in 
screening and monitoring borrowers (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Rajan, 1992). However, 
few studies obtain direct evidence on the presence of banks’ private information. 
We try to fill in the void between the theory and evidence. 
Specifically, we investigate banks’ private information using a survey of 
Japanese small firms on whether firms’ loan applications were accepted or 
rejected. This survey is similar to the National Survey of Small Business Finance 
(NSSBF) for U.S. firms. Combining the survey data with the financial statement 
data, we analyze the ex-post firm performance of loan applicants.   
Banks decide whether to make loans or not according to their judgment on 
the applicants’ creditworthiness. Their judgment is based on borrowing firms’ 
financial statements and other public information, and possibly on the private 
information that the banks have accumulated through their transactions with the 
borrowing firms. Though outsiders, including researchers, cannot directly observe 
banks’ private information, we can estimate its usefulness and accurateness by 
observing the ex-post performance of borrowing firms after bank screenings.   
One may simply think that if the ex-post performance of rejected firms turns 
out to be worse than that of accepted firms after controlling various financial 
variables, one can conclude that the bank’s private information was useful in 
predicting the firm performance. However, we should make a distinction between 
two different channels that potentially work between banks’ loan screening and 
borrowing firms’ ex-post performance. 
First, a bank screens borrowing firms using its private information to forecast 
the borrowers’ profitability and default probability. For example, the bank may  
 
2
have the market value of the firm’s real estate and other collateralized assets, 
credit guarantees and other off-balance-sheet liabilities, and the creditworthiness 
of the firm’s clients. The bank rejects the application for loans from a firm whose 
profitability and default probability are forecast to worsen. If the bank’s forecast 
is correct, the rejected firm will perform worse than the accepted firm after 
controlling for the firm characteristics contained in public information. We call 
the banks’ ability to forecast the borrowers’ future profitability the information 
production effect. 
Second, rejected firms may find it difficult to obtain other sources of funds, 
face a liquidity shortage, miss out on profitable opportunities and see its profits 
deteriorate. We call this financial constraint effect faced by rejected borrowers the 
information monopoly effect. This effect works if other banks do not have enough 
information on the creditworthiness of the rejected firm to lend to it. Though 
other banks can access public information, it may take considerable time and 
effort for them to process it before deciding whether to make loan a loan to the 
firm. Actually, small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) rarely disclose 
audited and reliable financial statements. Consequently, the rejected firm may 
experience a liquidity shortage. 
We present an empirical approach from which we can distinguish between 
the information production effect and the information monopoly effect, and we 
apply it to a unique dataset of Japanese SMEs. Specifically, we compare the 
ex-post performance between rejected firms and accepted firms to investigate the 
two effects of banks' private information. 
We also investigate whether the above two bank information effects are 
different among various types of firms. In particular, we examine how firm age 
and size affect the accumulation of private information on the part of banks. 
Literature on relationship banking (e.g., Boot, 2000) emphasize that banks 
accumulate private information through a long-run relationship with their client 
firms. In this case, banks are likely to accumulate the private information of  
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mature firms rather than young firms. In addition, bank information monopoly 
theory (e.g., Rajan, 1992) stresses that banks have an incentive to accumulate 
information on informationally opaque firms, because those firms find it difficult 
to raise funds in the public financial markets. In this case small firms, which tend 
to be informationally opaque, are more likely to be monitored by banks than large 
firms. To our best knowledge, this paper is the first that investigates the presence 
of banks' private information by looking at the ex-post firm performance after 
bank screening.   
  Some preceding studies examine the ex-post firm stock price or operating 
performance after bank failures. If banks monopolistically own private 
information on borrowing firms, borrowing firms will face difficulty in raising 
external finance and see their performance deteriorate. Slovin et al. (1993) 
supported this idea by examining the stock prices of the client firms of failing 
Illinois Bank. Bae et al. (2002) also shows that adverse shocks to banks in South 
Korea have a negative effect on the value of their client firms. On the other hand, 
Ongena et al. (2003) found only small and temporary impacts of the near-collapse 
of the Norwegian banking system during 1988-1991 on the stock prices of the 
client firms. For the client firms of failed Japanese banks, existing results are 
mixed: Yamori and Murakami (1999) found evidence supportive of the 
information monopoly hypothesis while Brewer et al. (2003) and Hori (2005) 
found evidence against it. These studies focus on the information monopoly effect.  
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To reveal the signal effect of bank private information, the response of stock 
prices to the announcement of new bank loans has been investigated. James 
(1987) and Lummer and MacConell (1989) find that following the announcement 
of new bank financing, the stock prices of the firms rise, suggesting that bank 
loans serve as favorable signals of the firms’ performance. However, they do not 
compare the performance between those that can borrow from banks and those 
that cannot. In a different context, Puri (1996) investigates the signal effect of 
bond underwriting by banks. Focusing on the U.S. bond market before the 
implementation of the Glass-Steagall Act, she found that banks’ underwriting 
raised the bond prices as compared with security companies’ underwriting. This 
finding also suggests that private information owned by banks serves as a 
positive signal.4  While she detects the banks’ information production effect in the 
securities underwriting business, we directly investigate the roles of bank private 
information in the bank loan business. 
This paper also contributes to the literature on relationship banking 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Angelini et al., 1998; Cole, 1998; Harhoff and Korting, 
1998; Boot, 2000). Existing studies on relationship banking examine the effects of 
bank-firm relationships on the availability and price of credit, obtaining positive 
results in most cases. While these studies judge the accumulation of private 
information on the part of banks by the availability and price of credit, we 
investigate the ex-post firm performance to see whether the above two 
information effects are different between young and mature firms, and between 
                                                  
4  Puri (1996) analyzes only the information production effect and implicitly assumes no 
information monopoly effect, which seems reasonable for firms that issue public bonds. 
However, for SMEs we cannot a priori neglect the possibility of the information 
monopoly effect.  
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small and large firms. 
  The rest of the paper is composed as follows. In Section 2, we present an 
empirical method that enables us to detect the information production effect and 
the information monopoly effect of bank private information. In Section 3, we 
describe our dataset. In Section 4, we present our empirical results. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  Hypotheses 
In this section, we present a simple model of the relationship between bank 
screening and firm profitability. Based on this model, we conduct an empirical 
analysis to test whether a bank has private information on the borrowing firm in 
the next section. 
A firm applies for a loan from a bank. The firm’s next-period profit depends 
on whether or not the bank accepts the loan application, as well as the firm’s 
current profit and other characteristics of the firm. If the bank rejects the loan 
application, the firm may find it difficult to obtain financing from other financial 
institutions, fall into financial difficulty, and miss out on profitable opportunities. 
We call this channel of bank private information on firm profitability the 
information monopoly effect. We specify the firm profit as   
(1)  1 2 1 0 1 + + + − − = it it
f
it it it v D B F F β β β , 
where the dependent variable  1 + it F   denotes firm  i ’s profit in year  1 + t . Among 
the dependent variables,  it D   is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
the bank rejects the loan application in year  t  and zero otherwise (REJECT). If 
the information monopoly effect works, the coefficient on REJECT turns out to be 
negative ( 2 β   is positive).  it F   denotes firm  i ’s profit as of year  t . If the firm’s 
profits are positively correlated over time,  0 β  is  positive. 
f
it B denotes a vector of  
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firm characteristics that is in the public information set, such as leverage and size. 
1 + it v  is a random shock that affects the firm’s next-period profit but is not 
included in the public information set.   
   The bank receives an imperfect signal,  it u , of the firm’s random shock  1 + it v . 
We assume  it u  and  1 + it v  to be drawn from the joint normal distribution with 
each mean zero, each variance 
2
u σ  and 
2
v σ ,  respectively, and the correlation 
coefficient  0 ≥ ρ .  ρ  represents the accuracy of the bank’s private information 
on the firm’s next-period profit. If  ρ  is positive, we say that the information 
production effect of bank private information works. The bank decides whether to 
accept the loan application or not based on the signal  it u . Specifically, the bank 
that receives the signal  it u  accepts the loan application if the firm’s expected 
profit, conditional on the bank granting the loan, exceeds some threshold value, 
1 + it F . 
(2a)  0 = it D   if  1 1 1 0 1 ] [ ] , 0 [ + + + > + − = = it it it
f
it it it it it F u v E B F u D F E β β , 
(2b)  1 = it D   otherwise.    
From the assumption of the joint normal distribution for  it u  and  1 + it v , 
(3)  it
u




ν = + ] [ 1 . 
The threshold value is assumed to depend on the bank’s capitalization and the 
bank-firm relationship. 
(4)  it it
m
it it X B F ε γ γ + − − = + 1 0 1 , 
where 
m
it B is a vector of the bank’s capitalization variables, and  it X is a vector of 
the bank-firm relationship variables. If a less-capitalized bank tends to apply a 
more stringent standard to accept the loan application (capital crunch), the 
coefficient on a variable in 
m




There are several reasons why the bank-firm relationship affects the threshold 
value,  1 + it F . The bank affiliated with the firm may want to rescue the firm even 
in an almost insolvent state by lending on favorable conditions (Peek and 
Rosengren, 2005). In addition, if the bank can gain profits besides loans from a 
wide-range of transactions with the firm, it may apply a looser standard to accept 
the loan application. For any case, the coefficient on a variable in  it X  is  expected 
to be negative ( 1 γ   to be positive).  it ε  is a random shock to the threshold value 
set by the bank that is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero, 
variance 
2
ε σ , and no correlation with  1 + it v  or  it u . 
    
Substituting (3) and (4) into (2a) and (2b), we can summarize the bank decision as 




it it it u X B B F D ~
1 0 1 0
* + − − + − = γ γ β β , 





















it it u u
σ
σ
ρ ε − ≡ ~   is a random shock drawn from the normal distribution 
with mean zero, variance 
2 2 2 2





) , ~ ( ~
v
v





− = ≡ +  
Equation (7) shows that  ρ ~
  is monotonically decreasing in  ρ  with the value of 
zero if  ρ  is  zero.  ρ ρ − ≈ ~  if 
2
ε σ  is  sufficiently  small. 
    
Now we can summarize two testable hypotheses concerning the effects of the 




Hypothesis 1: Information production effect. 
  If the bank decides whether to accept the loan application or not based on the 
private signal that is informative to the borrower’s future profit,  0 ~ < ρ .  
 
Hypothesis 2: Information monopoly effect. 
  If the bank’s rejection of the firm’s loan application causes the firm’s future 
profits to deteriorate due to the bank’s information monopoly, the coefficient on 
REJECT in Equation (1) is negative ( 0 2 > β ). 
 
To further clarify the above two effects, we derive the difference between the 
expected profits of the firm whose loan application is accepted and the firm whose 
loan application is rejected. Defining 




it it it X B B F σ γ γ β β φ φ − − + − = , and 




it it it X B B F σ γ γ β β − − + − Φ = Φ , 
where  φ  and Φ denote the marginal and cumulative density functions of the 






it it it it B F D F E
Φ
+ − − = = +
φ














it it it it B F D F E
1
~ ] 0 | [ 1 0 1
φ
σ ρ β β . 
From Equations (10) and (11), we obtain   
(12) 
] 1 [
~ ] 0 [ ] 1 | [ 2 1 , 1
it it
it
v it t i it it D F E D F E
Φ − Φ
+ − = = − = + +
φ
σ ρ β . 
(see Green, 2008, for example). Equation (12) shows that the difference between 
the expected profit of the rejected and the accepted firm depends on the 





v Φ − Φ
φ




3.  Empirical Methodology and Data 
3.1 Methodology 
Because the bank’s decision and the firm’s future profitability depends on 
each other, as we have shown in Section 2, we perform the simultaneous 
estimation of Equations (1) and (5) using the maximum likelihood estimator.5 
Hypothesis 1 (the information production effect) can be tested by determining  
whether or not the correlation coefficients of the error terms of the two equations 
is negative. Hypothesis 2 (the information monopoly effect) can be tested by 




We use the Corporate Finance Survey published by the Small and Medium 
Enterprise Agency in December, 2001. This Survey is similar to the NSSBF1993 (the 
National Survey of Small Business Finance) for similar size U.S firms. The sample 
firms are randomly drawn from the firms contained in the TSR (Tokyo Shoko Research) 
database belonging to all industries except agriculture, fishery and forestry, financial 
services, and public services. Large firms are included in the sample so that they 
account for 10 percent of the total in each industry. The inquiries cover the three-year 
period from January 1999 to December 2001. 
 The Survey contains information on whether the firms’ applications for loans had 
been rejected by their main banks in the preceding three years. The Survey also 
includes information on the number of years the firms have been in business, the 
numbers of employees, the numbers of years over which they have been transacting 
with their main bank, the year when they changed their main banks, the number of 
financial institutions that service their banking needs, and their industries as of the 
end of October 2001. In addition, the Survey contains information on whether the firms’ 
business conditions are good, unchanged, or bad for each of the last three years. 
                                                  
5  This is a so-called treatment effect model.  
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We obtain information about the firms’ financial statements and their main banks 
from the TSR database. The firms’ main banks are identified as the first financial 
institutions listed in the TSR database.6 The Survey data is linked to the main banks’ 
financial statements available in the Nikkei Needs database. 
 In the National Survey of Small Business Finance, all other data are available for 
only one year, with the exception of sales figures (Peterson and Rajan, 1997). One 
advantage of our survey that is different from the NSSBF is that the availability of 
subsequent firm performance. This enables us to investigate the implications of the 
information hypotheses as they pertain to the time series.   
 
Sample Selection 
We use the data as of years 2000 and 2001 for the years of bank screening (year  t  
in Equations (1) and (5)) and examine the ex-post performance of firms in years 2001 
and 2002. From detailed information for year 2001 that included the number of years 
firms had been transacting with their main banks, the number of financial institutions 
that firms were transacting with, and the share of loans that were issued by their main 
banks, we were able to infer those same pieces of information for year 2000.   
The sample consists of the firms that satisfy the following four conditions. First, 
they are classified as small or medium-sized enterprises according to the Small and 
Medium-Sized Firm Fundamental Law.7 Second, their main financial institutions are 
                                                  
6  The Corporate Finance Survey does not contain information on the firms’ main banks. 
The first financial institution listed in the TSR database has been determined by TSR 
researchers to be the most important one, based on the information they obtain from the 
firm managers. As such, it should coincide with the one firm managers also regard as 
the most important. However, if a firm changes its main bank during the inquiry period, 
the "most important bank" may be different. It is because of this reason we exclude 
those firms that changed main banks during the inquiry period (Jan. 1999 - Dec. 2001). 
7 The Small and Medium-Sized Firm Fundamental Law defines SMEs, in principle, 
as those firms whose equity is ¥300 million yen or less, or who have 300 employees 
or less. However, the maximum capital amounts are set to ¥100 million for  
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major banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, first-tier regional banks, second-tier 
regional banks or credit banks (shinkin) whose financial statements are available. 
Third, we exclude those firms whose loan applications were rejected consecutively for 
two years or more. Thus we can accurately identify the effects of a firm's loan rejection 
in one year on its profit in the following year. Finally, to identify the firms’ main banks 
correctly, we restrict our sample firms to those who did not change their main banks 
during 1999-2001. The number of remaining firms that satisfy these conditions is 3,173. 
Loan rejections account for a 3.4% share of the 4,687 firm-year samples.8 
 
Variables 
We first describe the variables in the loan rejection equation (5), and then those in 
the firm profit equation (1). 
As a measure of firm profit,  it F , we use EBTDA (Earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization) as a proportion of total assets. EBTDA represents the 
firm’s cash flow and is therefore an appropriate measure of firm profitability. On the 
other hand and in spite of being widely used in other studies of Japanese firms, ROA 
(after-tax return on assets) is problematic for our purpose because a firm whose loan 
application is rejected may reduce investment and hence capital stock and depreciation, 
which has an increasing effect on ROA. 
As firm characteristic variables, 
f
it B , we use the debt-to-asset ratio (DEBT), 
business condition dummy (BUSINESS), sales-to-asset ratio (SALES), and logarithm of 
                                                                                                                                                  
wholesale industries and ¥50 million yen for retail and service industries, and the 
maximum number of employees is set to 100 for wholesale and service industries 
and 50 for retail industries. 
8 While our data source is the same as that of Hosono et al., (2003), our sample size is 
smaller than their 3,576 because we restrict our sample firms to those whose financial 
variables, including EBITDA, that we have made available by matching the Survey 
data to the TSR database.  
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the number of employers (SIZE).9  BUSINESS takes the value of one if the firm 
responded “good” or “unchanged” to the question of business conditions, and the value of 
zero if it responded with “bad." A high DEBT means a high default risk and hence is 
likely to result in a high probability of rejection, implying that it takes a positive sign in 
the loan rejection equation (1). On the other hand, high SALES and BUSINESS are 
expected to take negative coefficients in the loan rejection equation (5).   
   Appropriate measures for bank capitalization, 
m
it B , are difficult to find because 
accounting capital including the risk-adjusted regulatory capital ratio under the Basel 
standard (the so-called BIS ratio) are often prone to discretion and not coincident with 
the economic value of capital (e.g., Shrieves and Dahl, 2003). Given no one perfect 
measure, we use three alternative variables. One is the difference between the BIS ratio 
and the minimum requirement level (8% for internationally active banks and 4% for 
domestic banks) (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 2005). We call it CAPITAL MARGIN. 
Another is the share of non-performing loans, i.e., risk-management loans,10 in total 
assets (NPL), which is supposed to be negatively correlated with the economic value of 
capital. The last one is the growth rate of deposits outstanding (DEPOSIT). If a large 
amount of deposits are drawn from a poorly capitalized bank, the bank may face a 
liquidity shortage and be forced to reduce loans by applying strict standards in 
screening loan applications. In the loan rejection equation (5), CAPITAL MARGIN and 
DEPOSIT are supposed to take negative coefficients, while NPL is supposed to take a 
positive coefficient. In the case of DEPOSIT, however, it may take a positive coefficient 
if depositors draw deposits from banks with loose screening standards because they 
consider such banks to be risky. 
                                                  
9 We add the logarithm of the number of years a firm has been in business as an 
explanatory variable of Equation (5), finding that it takes an insignificant coefficient 
and it is highly correlated with the number of years a firm has been transacting with its 
main bank.   
10 Risk-management loans are defined as the sum of loans to borrowers in legal 
bankruptcy, past due loans three months or more in arrears, and restructured loans.  
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For the firm-bank relationship measure,  it X , we use the number of years the firm 
has been transacting with its main bank (RELATIONSHIP YEARS) and the number of 
financial institutions that the firm transacts with. These measures are widely used in 
the literature on relationship-banking, especially for SME finance (Petersen and Rajan, 
1994; Angelini et al., 1998, Cole, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 1998, among others). The 
firms that have been transacting with their main banks for a long time and those that 
transact with a small number of financial institutions are supposed to have a strong 
relationship with their main banks. Considering that the effect of the number of 
financial institutions on the main bank’s decision on loan screening is supposed to be 
nonlinear (Hosono et al., 2004), we use a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
the number of the transacting financial institutions is four or more, and the value of 
zero otherwise (NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS). In the loan rejection equation (5), 
RELATIONSHIP YEARS and NUMBER OF INSTITUSIONS are supposed to take 
negative and positive coefficients, respectively. 
   Finally, we add the collateral dummy to the explanatory variables of the loan 
rejection equation (5). This dummy (COLLATERAL) takes the value of one if the firm 
provides its main bank with collateral and the value of zero otherwise. There are two 
competing theories concerning the role of collateral in SME financing. Bester (1985) 
posits that a low risk firm pledges collateral to distinguish itself from a high risk firm, 
while Boot et al., (1991) insists that a bank demands a high risk firm to pledge collateral 
to curb the firm’s moral hazard. In the former case, a bank is more likely to lend to a 
firm that offers collateral, because the bank considers such a firm to be less risky. On 
the other hand, in the latter case a bank is less likely to lend to a firm that offers 
collateral because the bank considers such a firm to be more risky. There are also 
competing theories concerning the role of collateral in bank monitoring. Rajan and 
Winton (1995) argue that collateral can increase a lender’s incentive to monitor under 
certain conditions. In their model, when banks demand collateral it signals that a firm 
is in bad shape. On the other hand, Manove et al., (2001) posit that strong creditor 
protection may result in an inefficiently low level of project screening by banks,  
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suggesting that a low quality firm is less likely to post collateral and more likely to be 
rejected. Based on their evidence, we may presume that those firms that offer collateral 
are more likely to be rejected. 
     In the firm profit equation (1), the profit,  it F , is EBITDA, as in the loan rejection 
equation (5). If EBITDA is serially correlated, its coefficient is positive. As firm 
characteristics variables, we use BUSINESS, SIZE, and the logarithm of the firm age 
(AGE). BUSINESS is supposed to take a positive coefficient, while AGE is supposed to 
take a negative coefficient if a young firm is likely to grow rapidly.11
 
 
Descriptive Sample Statistics 
      Table 1 presents the descriptive sample statistics of all the samples and sub-samples 
for accepted firms and rejected ones. One feature of Japanese firm-bank relationships is 
that most firms, even SMEs, transact with multiple banks. About one-sixth of our 
sample firms transact with four or more banks.   
Comparing  ｔｈｅ  accepted and rejected firms, we see that rejected firms exhibit a 
high  DEBT, a low EBITDA, low SALES, bad BUSINESS, a young AGE, short 
RELATIONSHIP YEARS, a small SIZE, and a high likelihood of COLLATERAL. 
Rejected firms’ next-period EBITDA is lower than accepted firms. 
 
4.  Estimation Results 
4.1 Results for all sample firms 
Table 2 presents the estimation results for all sample firms. We first look at the loan 
rejection equation (5). EBITDA has a negative and significant coefficient, as is expected. 
                                                  
11  We add the debt-to-asset ratio and sales-to-asset ratio to the explanatory variables of 
Equation (1), finding that neither of them has a significant coefficient and that no other 
variables change the significance levels of the coefficients. We also add nine regional 




Among the firm characteristics variables, BUSINESS and SIZE have negative and 
significant coefficients, while DEBT has a positive and significant coefficient. As for the 
bank capitalization variables, neither CAPITAL MARGIN nor NPL are significant, 
suggesting no evidence of a capital crunch. DEPOSIT has a positive and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that depositors withdraw deposits from a bank that adopts a 
loose standard for loan screening. Looking at the firm-bank relationship variables, 
RELATIONSHIP YEARS has a negative and significant coefficient, and NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS has a positive and significant coefficient, as expected. Finally, 
COLLATERAL takes a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that a bank tends 
to demand collateral from a risky borrower and tends to reject such a firm’s loan 
application. 
Turning to the firm profit equation (1), EBITDA and BUSINESS take positive and 
significant coefficients, as expected, and AGE takes a negative and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that younger firms are likely to increase profits more rapidly. 
Looking at the two-bank private information effects, we see that the information 
monopoly effect is not significant, while the information production effect is significant, 
as can be seen in the loan rejection dummy in Equation (1) and the correlation 
coefficient of the residuals from Equations (1) and (5), respectively. In Japan, most 
SMEs transact with multiple financial institutions, which may result in our findings 
against the information monopoly effect.12 
 
4.2 Firm Size, Age and Relationship-Lending 
Bank private information effects may depend on firm age and size. Firm age may 
matter because relationship-banking theory posits that banks acquire and accumulate 
private information through long running relationships with client firms. Banks may 
                                                  
12  Our findings against the information monopoly effect are also consistent with Hosono 
et al., (2004), suggesting that multiple financial institutions share borrowers’ 
information through transactions.  
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not yet have enough information for young firms. If this is the case, the information 
production effect is negligible for young firms. Firm size may also matter because more 
and more medium-sized firms are beginning to access market-based financing sources, 
including privately placed bonds and syndicated loans, for which multiple financial 
institutions and investors share information on the firms. For medium-sized firms, 
public information is so abundant that banks have little incentive to accumulate private 
information on them. Considering such heterogeneity among SMEs, we divide the 
sample firms into three categories: young firms, small and mature firms, and 
medium-size mature firms. We regard firms that have been in business for thirteen 
years or more, which is the fifth percentile, as mature firms and the other firms as 
young firms. We consider those firms with at least 87 employees, which is the 
seventy-fifth percentile, as medium-sized firms and the others as small firms. 
Tables 3A, 3B and 3C describe the sample statistics for each sub-sample of firms. 
The proportion of loan rejections was 4.4%, the highest, for young firms, 3.9% for small 
and mature firms, and 1.7%, the lowest, for medium-sized mature firms. In each group, 
rejected firms display a high DEBT, a low EBITDA, low SALES, short RELATIONSHIP 
YEARS, small SIZE, and a high likelihood of COLLATEAL. While the AGE of rejected 
firms is less than that of accepted medium-sized mature firms, no such tendency can be 
observed for young firms or small and mature firms. 
Tables 4A, 4B and 4C present the estimation results for each subgroup. Table 4A 
shows the results for young firms. In the loan rejection equation (5), there is no variable 
that takes a significant coefficient if all the explanatory variables are included (in 
columns 1 to 3). Taking into consideration the possibility that young firms’ financial 
statements are often opaque and unreliable, we omit the financial statement variables 
and re-estimate the model, finding that BUSINESS and SIZE take negative and 
significant coefficients in the results for all sample firms. In the firm profit equation (1), 
EBITDA and BUSINESS take positive and significant coefficients, while SIZE is not 
significant. AGE takes positive and significant coefficients, unlike the all-sample results, 
implying that the relationship between firm age and profit is non-linear. Looking at the  
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correlation coefficient of the residuals, we observe no information production effect. This 
result is consistent with the relationship-bank theory, which posits that banks 
accumulate private information through their long-running relationships with firms 
(e.g., Boot, 2000). As for the information monopoly effect, the coefficient for REJECT is 
negative but not significant, which may be the result of a relatively small sample size. 
Table 4B shows the results for medium-sized mature firms. In the loan rejection 
equation (5), EBITDA,  SIZE and RELATIONSHIP YEARS take negative and 
significant coefficients and DEBT takes a positive and significant coefficient, like the 
results for all sample firms. Unlike the results for the entire sample, however, 
NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS takes a negative and significant coefficient, possibly 
suggesting that many banks compete to transact with good medium-sized, mature firms. 
In the firm profit equation (1), EBITDA and BUSINESS take positive and significant 
coefficients. Importantly, we observe no information monopoly effect or information 
production effect, consistent with the casual observation that medium-sized mature 
firms can access various financing sources in the markets. 
   Finally, Table 4C shows the results for small mature firms. The overall results are 
similar to those for all sample firms. In the loan rejection equation (5), EBITDA, 
BUSINESS, SALES, SIZE and RELATIONSHIP YEARS take negative and significant 
coefficients while DEBT,  NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS,  COLLATERAL, and 
DEPOSIT take positive and significant coefficients. In the firm profit equation (1), 
EBITDA and BUSINESS take positive and significant coefficients, and AGE takes a 
negative and significant coefficient. The information production effect is significant, as 
it is for the full sample results. On the other hand, the coefficient on REJECT in 
Equation (1) is positive and significant at the 10% level, which is not consistent with the 
information monopoly effect. 
      We can summarize the sub-sample results with the explanation that the full-sample 





4.3 Comparisons with the existing literature 
Some previous studies examine the information monopoly effect by investigating 
the effects of bank failures on client firms. Slovin et al. (1993) found that the stock 
prices of client firms moved down when the Continental Illinois Bank was on the verge 
of failure, and then moved up when Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation began to 
rescue the Bank. Bae et al. (2002) show that adverse shocks to Korean banks during the 
1997-98 period had a negative effect on the values of their client firms and that this 
adverse effect on firm value is a decreasing function of the financial health of both the 
banks and their client firms.   
On the other hand, Ongena et al., (2003) used the near-collapse of the Norwegian 
banking system during 1988-1991 to investigate the impact of bank distress 
announcements on the stock prices of firms maintaining a relationship with a 
distressed bank. They found that firms faced only small and temporary changes, on 
average, in stock price and that firms with access to unused liquid bank funds and firms 
that issued equity just prior to the crisis experienced relatively high abnormal returns.   
For the failures of Japanese banks, there are mixed results. Yamori and Murakami 
(1999) found that the failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in 1997 had a negative 
impact on the stock returns of client firms. Hori (2005) also picked up the failure of 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and extended sample firms to include unlisted client firms. 
He found that no significant difference existed between client firms and non-client firms 
after the bank failure, though he also showed that those client firms that had 
low-grades before the failure and those that were not transferred to Hokuyo Bank 
when it acquired the business of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, saw their profits 
deteriorate. Brewer et al., (2003) examined the failures of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, 
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, and Nippon Credit Bank during 1997-1998, and 
found that the declines in the stock returns of the client firms on the dates of the 
disclosure of failures were not significantly different from those of non-client firms. 
Given the various events and different time periods or countries, it is difficult to 
directly compare these preceding studies. However, the evidence for the information  
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monopoly effect in Japan seems to be weaker than it is in the U.S. This may be due to 
the fact that most Japanese firms transact with many banks. Our evidence against the 
information monopoly effect also supports this view. 
Some other studies, though few, are concerned with the information production 
effect. James (1987) and Lummer and MacConell (1989) find that following the 
announcement of new bank financing, the stock prices of the firms rise. Puri (1996) 
found that banks’ underwriting raised the bond prices as compared with security 
companies’ underwriting in the U.S. bond market before the implementation of the 
Glass-Steagall Act. Though they do not directly compare the ex-post performance of 
rejected firms and accepted firms, all of their findings are consistent with the bank 
information effect, which we have detected in this paper. 
Evidence found in the relationship-banking literature is also related to this paper. 
Petersen and Rajan, (1994) analyzed data collected in a survey of U.S. small firms (the 
National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) collected by the U.S. Small 
Business Administration) and found that the effects of relationship are larger on the 
availability of credit than on the price of credit. In particular, they found that firm age 
and the length of the longest relationship had positive impacts on the availability of 
credit while the number of institutions firms borrowed from had a negative impact. The 
positive firm age effect found in their study is consistent with our results. Berkowitz 
and White, (2002) also used data from the 1993 NSSBF and found that the years of the 
bank relationship were negatively correlated with the credit constraint under which 
firms were discouraged or denied. They also found that the owner’s age was negatively 
correlated with credit constraint in the case of non-corporate firms, and that the firm 
size (measured by employment) was negatively correlated with it in the case of 
corporate firms.13  
                                                  
13  Berkowitz and White (2002) find that high homestead exemptions tend to lead to 
credit constraint under which firms are either discouraged or denied. For the effects of 
bankruptcy laws on small firm finance and entrepreneurial activity, see Gropp et al., 
(1996) and Fan and White, (2003), respectively.  
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Angelini et al., (1998) used a sample of small Italian firms. They found that with 
banks other than cooperative banks, lending rates tend to increase with the length of 
the relationship for all customers, whereas with local cooperative banks this is the case 
for non-member customers only. Their result, which is in line with bank capture or 
informational monopoly theories (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992), may be surprising given 
that small Italian firms tend to deal with multiple banks (Detragiache et al., 2000). 
Harhoff and Körting, (1998) analyzed data in a survey of small- and medium-sized 
German firms and found that relationship variables have a bearing on loan 
collateralization and availability. 
Finally, we point out that our estimation results on the role of collateral in bank 
screening are consistent with Ono and Uesugi (2009), who found a positive correlation 
between the borrowers’ risk and the presence of collateral. On the other hand, empirical 
evidence for U.S. SMEs is mixed. Berger and Udel, (1990, 1995) and Pozzolo (2004) 
found a positive correlation between borrowers’ risk and the presence of collateral, while 
Elsas and Krahnen (2000) found no significant correlation between them.   
 
5. Conclusion 
      Observing the bank screening of loan applications and the ex-post firm performance, 
we investigated the accuracy of bank private information. Specifically, we examined 
whether banks screen loan applications based on private information on firms’ future 
profitability (the information production effect), and whether rejected firms cannot be 
refinanced and consequently experience reduced profits (the information monopoly 
effect). Using a dataset for Japanese SMEs, we obtained strong evidence supportive of 
the information production effect, while we found no evidence to support the 
information monopoly effect. We also found that this result is mainly driven by 
relatively small and mature SMEs, for which a strong information production effect can 
be observed. 
      Our results are consistent with the relationship-bank theory positing that banks 
acquire and accumulate private information through long-run relationships with  
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borrowing firms, especially with small, mature firms, who face difficulty obtaining 
financing from markets (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berkowitz and White, 2002; Harhoff 
and Körting, 1998) . Our results also suggest that the information monopoly problems 
raised by Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990) may not be very serious for Japanese SMEs, 
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Table 1. Descriptive Sample Statistics
variable no. of obs. mean median sd
Loan Screening
REJECT 6695 0.034 0.000 0.181
Firm Characteristics
EBITDA 6695 5.179 4.327 7.571
EBITDA(t+1) 6695 4.954 4.159 6.830
SALES 6695 1.469 1.269 1.111
DEBT 6695 0.763 0.792 0.227
NO. OF WORKERS 6695 71.173 41.000 89.510
AGE 6695 42.407 39.000 22.183
BUSINESS 6695 0.685 1.000 0.464
BUSINESS(t+1) 6695 0.583 1.000 0.493
Bank Characteristics
DEPOSIT 6695 1.681 1.691 3.006
NPL 6695 4.023 3.646 1.911
CAPITAL MARGIN 6695 4.745 4.290 2.102
Firm-Bank Relationships
RELATIONSHIP YEARS 6695 31.810 30.000 15.030
NO. OF INSTITUTIONS(>=4) 6695 0.174 0.000 0.379
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 6695 0.845 1.000 0.362
Firm Characteristics
EBITDA 6469 5.304 4.417 7.533
EBITDA(t+1) 6469 5.064 4.227 6.745
SALES 6469 1.475 1.275 1.119
DEBT 6469 0.758 0.788 0.226
NO. OF WORKERS 6469 72.199 42.000 90.515
AGE 6469 42.500 39.000 22.209
BUSINESS 6469 0.693 1.000 0.461
BUSINESS(t+1) 6469 0.593 1.000 0.491
Bank Characteristics
DEPOSIT 6469 1.669 1.650 3.009
NPL 6469 4.020 3.646 1.916
CAPITAL MARGIN 6469 4.746 4.290 2.097
Firm-Bank Relationships
RELATIONSHIP YEARS 6469 31.935 30.000 15.035
NO. OF INSTITUTIONS(>=4) 6469 0.173 0.000 0.378
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 6469 0.842 1.000 0.365
Firm Characteristics
EBITDA 226 1.616 2.566 7.801
EBITDA(t+1) 226 1.785 2.681 8.322
SALES 226 1.309 1.074 0.839
DEBT 226 0.896 0.897 0.217
NO. OF WORKERS 226 41.819 27.500 44.162
AGE 226 39.739 35.000 21.313
BUSINESS 226 0.482 0.000 0.501
BUSINESS(t+1) 226 0.296 0.000 0.458
Bank Characteristics
DEPOSIT 226 2.043 1.934 2.880
NPL 226 4.113 3.682 1.748
CAPITAL MARGIN 226 4.715 4.170 2.252
Firm-Bank Relationships
RELATIONSHIP YEARS 226 28.226 29.000 14.462
NO. OF INSTITUTIONS(>=4) 226 0.208 0.000 0.407
Other Controls







Table 2. Estimation results for all the sample firms
123
EBITDA (t+1): Eq. (1)
EBITDA 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.333***
(32.99) (32.97) (32.97)
BUSINESS (t+1) 2.403*** 2.403*** 2.403***
(15.81) (15.80) (15.80)
SIZE 0.221*** 0.220*** 0.220***
(2.64) (2.63) (2.63)
AGE -0.650*** -0.650*** -0.650***
(4.61) (4.62) (4.62)
REJECT 0.05 -0.03 -0.033
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05)




DEBT 0.647*** 0.652*** 0.648***
(5.35) (5.36) (5.34)
EBITDA -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.020***
(4.17) (4.05) (4.05)
BUSINESS -0.315*** -0.314*** -0.314***
(4.89) (4.89) (4.89)
SALES -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.115***
(2.89) (2.94) (2.90)










RELATIONSHIP YEARS -0.174*** -0.170*** -0.168***
(3.42) (3.37) (3.32)
NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS 0.136* 0.130* 0.131*
(1.73) (1.66) (1.67)
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 0.427*** 0.415*** 0.414***
(3.67) (3.58) (3.57)
Constant -1.215*** -1.132*** -1.140***
(4.78) (4.30) (4.35)
athrho -0.104** -0.097** -0.097**
(2.53) (2.35) (2.35)
lnsigma 1.798*** 1.798*** 1.798***
(207.23) (207.31) (207.31)
No. of Observations 6695 6695 6695
Log Likelihood -22424.54 -22427.71 -22427.75
Wald 1859.19 1859.36 1859.46
Prob 0 0 0
LR-test 4.86 4.29 4.25
Prob>chi2 0.03 0.04 0.04
Notes
1. ***, ** and * represent the significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
2. athrho is the inverse hyperbolic tangent of ρ: athrho=0.5*ln((1+ρ)/(1-ρ)),
    where ρis the correlation coefficient of the residuals of Eq. (1) and (5)
3. lnsigma is ln(σ), where σ is the standard error of the residual of Eq. (1).
4. LR-test is the Χ-square statistics of the null hypothesis that ρis zero.   
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Table 3A. Descriptive Sample Statistics for Young Firms (Age<=13)
variable no. of obs. mean median sd
Loan Screening
REJECT 388 0.044 0.000 0.205
Firm Characteristics
EBITDA 388 6.784 4.975 18.665
EBITDA(t+1) 388 6.301 4.648 9.961
SALES 388 2.144 1.892 1.442
DEBT 388 0.883 0.873 0.370
NO. OF WORKERS 388 37.693 22.000 50.187
AGE 388 9.464 10.000 2.908
BUSINESS 388 0.753 1.000 0.432
BUSINESS(t+1) 388 0.673 1.000 0.470
Bank Characteristics
DEPOSIT 388 1.651 1.636 2.927
NPL 388 4.016 3.628 2.118
CAPITAL MARGIN 388 4.605 4.160 2.164
Firm-Bank Relationships
RELATIONSHIP YEARS 388 10.369 10.000 6.181
NO. OF INSTITUTIONS(>=4) 388 0.103 0.000 0.304
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 388 0.629 1.000 0.484
Firm Characteristics
EBITDA 371 6.997 5.110 18.949
EBITDA(t+1) 371 6.555 4.955 9.811
SALES 371 2.145 1.873 1.455
DEBT 371 0.882 0.873 0.377
NO. OF WORKERS 371 38.491 23.000 50.967
AGE 371 9.461 10.000 2.908
BUSINESS 371 0.763 1.000 0.426
BUSINESS(t+1) 371 0.687 1.000 0.464
Bank Characteristics
DEPOSIT 371 1.643 1.636 2.967
NPL 371 4.027 3.628 2.147
CAPITAL MARGIN 371 4.569 4.120 2.111
Firm-Bank Relationships
RELATIONSHIP YEARS 371 10.404 10.000 6.256
NO. OF INSTITUTIONS(>=4) 371 0.102 0.000 0.304
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 371 0.623 1.000 0.485
Firm Characteristics
EBITDA 17 2.122 2.759 9.948
EBITDA(t+1) 17 0.759 3.127 11.827
SALES 17 2.118 2.277 1.141
DEBT 17 0.911 0.894 0.122
NO. OF WORKERS 17 20.294 10.000 22.707
AGE 17 9.529 11.000 3.002
BUSINESS 17 0.529 1.000 0.514
BUSINESS(t+1) 17 0.353 0.000 0.493
Bank Characteristics
DEPOSIT 17 1.824 1.861 1.894
NPL 17 3.778 3.593 1.384
CAPITAL MARGIN 17 5.378 4.260 3.094
Firm-Bank Relationships
RELATIONSHIP YEARS 17 9.588 10.000 4.273
NO. OF INSTITUTIONS(>=4) 17 0.118 0.000 0.332
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 17 0.765 1.000 0.437
A. All young firms
B. Accepted  young firms
C. Rejected young firms 
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Table 3B. Descriptive Sample Statistics for Middle-sized Matured Firms (Age>13 and No. of Workers>87)
variable no. of obs. mean median sd
Loan Screening
REJECT 1620 0.017 0.000 0.128
Firm Characteristics
EBITDA 1620 5.776 5.038 6.361
EBITDA(t+1) 1620 5.316 4.837 6.672
SALES 1620 1.246 1.114 0.664
DEBT 1620 0.731 0.763 0.198
NO. OF WORKERS 1620 182.729 151.000 121.224
AGE 1620 51.539 48.500 23.255
BUSINESS 1620 0.706 1.000 0.456
BUSINESS(t+1) 1620 0.618 1.000 0.486
Bank Characteristics
DEPOSIT 1620 1.817 1.744 3.288
NPL 1620 3.680 3.458 1.513
CAPITAL MARGIN 1620 4.405 4.110 1.666
Firm-Bank Relationships
RELATIONSHIP YEARS 1620 36.836 36.000 15.637
NO. OF INSTITUTIONS(>=4) 1620 0.185 0.000 0.388
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 1620 0.865 1.000 0.342
Firm Characteristics
EBITDA 1593 5.833 5.082 6.358
EBITDA(t+1) 1593 5.411 4.860 6.602
SALES 1593 1.249 1.118 0.660
DEBT 1593 0.729 0.762 0.198
NO. OF WORKERS 1593 183.505 151.000 121.898
AGE 1593 51.699 49.000 23.331
BUSINESS 1593 0.709 1.000 0.454
BUSINESS(t+1) 1593 0.621 1.000 0.485
Bank Characteristics
DEPOSIT 1593 1.807 1.744 3.266
NPL 1593 3.674 3.458 1.512
CAPITAL MARGIN 1593 4.407 4.110 1.664
Firm-Bank Relationships
RELATIONSHIP YEARS 1593 36.996 36.000 15.632
NO. OF INSTITUTIONS(>=4) 1593 0.186 0.000 0.390
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 1593 0.864 1.000 0.343
Firm Characteristics
EBITDA 27 2.405 2.420 5.714
EBITDA(t+1) 27 -0.309 0.436 8.347
SALES 27 1.059 0.788 0.829
DEBT 27 0.829 0.890 0.165
NO. OF WORKERS 27 136.926 126.000 54.880
AGE 27 42.111 47.000 15.858
BUSINESS 27 0.519 1.000 0.509
BUSINESS(t+1) 27 0.407 0.000 0.501
Bank Characteristics
DEPOSIT 27 2.444 1.482 4.419
NPL 27 4.009 3.688 1.618
CAPITAL MARGIN 27 4.248 3.600 1.772
Firm-Bank Relationships
RELATIONSHIP YEARS 27 27.370 29.000 12.977
NO. OF INSTITUTIONS(>=4) 27 0.074 0.000 0.267
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 27 0.926 1.000 0.267
A. All middle-sized matured firms
B. Accepted middle-sized matured firms
C. Rejected middle-sized matured firms 
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Table 3C. Descripteive Sample Statistics for Small Matured Firms (Age>13 and No. of Workers<=87)
variable no. of obs. mean median sd
Loan Screening
REJECT 4687 0.039 0.000 0.193
Firm Characteristics
EBITDA 4687 4.840 4.052 6.219
EBITDA(t+1) 4687 4.717 3.899 6.542
SALES 4687 1.490 1.305 1.177
DEBT 4687 0.764 0.795 0.218
NO. OF WORKERS 4687 35.387 31.000 22.001
AGE 4687 41.978 39.000 19.913
BUSINESS 4687 0.673 1.000 0.469
BUSINESS(t+1) 4687 0.564 1.000 0.496
Bank Characteristics
DEPOSIT 4687 1.637 1.650 2.908
NPL 4687 4.142 3.688 1.999
CAPITAL MARGIN 4687 4.874 4.460 2.215
Firm-Bank Relationships
RELATIONSHIP YEARS 4687 31.847 30.000 13.721
NO. OF INSTITUTIONS(>=4) 4687 0.177 0.000 0.381
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 4687 0.856 1.000 0.351
Firm Characteristics
EBITDA 4505 4.977 4.126 6.105
EBITDA(t+1) 4505 4.819 3.967 6.461
SALES 4505 1.499 1.314 1.189
DEBT 4505 0.758 0.789 0.215
NO. OF WORKERS 4505 35.616 31.000 22.044
AGE 4505 41.968 39.000 19.877
BUSINESS 4505 0.681 1.000 0.466
BUSINESS(t+1) 4505 0.575 1.000 0.494
Bank Characteristics
DEPOSIT 4505 1.622 1.636 2.916
NPL 4505 4.141 3.688 2.007
CAPITAL MARGIN 4505 4.881 4.460 2.215
Firm-Bank Relationships
RELATIONSHIP YEARS 4505 31.918 30.000 13.703
NO. OF INSTITUTIONS(>=4) 4505 0.174 0.000 0.379
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 4505 0.852 1.000 0.355
Firm Characteristics
EBITDA 182 1.452 2.552 7.878
EBITDA(t+1) 182 2.192 2.705 7.924
SALES 182 1.270 1.069 0.767
DEBT 182 0.905 0.898 0.230
NO. OF WORKERS 182 29.720 25.000 20.153
AGE 182 42.209 36.000 20.858
BUSINESS 182 0.473 0.000 0.501
BUSINESS(t+1) 182 0.275 0.000 0.448
Bank Characteristics
DEPOSIT 182 2.004 2.061 2.676
NPL 182 4.160 3.682 1.800
CAPITAL MARGIN 182 4.722 4.225 2.221
Firm-Bank Relationships
RELATIONSHIP YEARS 182 30.093 29.000 14.069
NO. OF INSTITUTIONS(>=4) 182 0.236 0.000 0.426
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 182 0.945 1.000 0.229
A. All small matured firms
B. Accepted small matured firms




Table 4A. Estimation Results for Young Firms (AGE<=13)
12 3 4
EBITDA (t+1): Eq. (1)
EBITDA 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.110***
(4.29) (4.29) (4.29) (4.370)
BUSINESS (t+1) 5.554*** 5.555*** 5.551*** 5.679***
(5.56) (5.57) (5.57) (5.740)
SIZE 0.451 0.45 0.449
(0.93) (0.92) (0.93)
AGE 3.135*** 3.132*** 3.131*** 3.266***
(2.63) (2.63) (2.63) (2.760)
REJECT -6.458 -6.549 -6.631 -5.25
(1.09) (1.11) (1.21) (1.100)
Constant -5.416 -5.396 -5.405* -4.146
(1.640) (1.640) (1.650) (1.420)
REJECT: Eq. (5)
Firm Characteristics
DEBT -0.148 -0.145 -0.164
(0.32) (0.31) (0.34)
EBITDA -0.014 -0.013 -0.015
(1.00) (0.96) (1.08)
BUSINESS -0.401 -0.4 -0.389 -0.478**
(1.57) (1.57) (1.51) (2.010)
SALES -0.022 -0.02 -0.03
(0.24) (0.21) (0.33)
SIZE -0.202 -0.21 -0.185 -0.222*









RELATIONSHIP YEARS -0.111 -0.102 -0.136
(0.41) (0.38) (0.51)
NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS -0.011 -0.015 -0.071
(0.03) (0.04) (0.18)
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 0.305 0.315 0.293
(1.10) (1.13) (1.05)
Constant -0.612 -0.429 -0.811 -0.741*
(0.79) (0.52) (1.02) (1.860)
athrho 0.157 0.162 0.168 0.082
(0.52) (0.54) (0.60) (0.360)
lnsigma 2.174*** 2.175*** 2.175*** 2.174***
(58.72) (58.65) (58.80) (60.220)
No. of Observations 388 388 388 388
Log Likelihood -1457.95 -1457.88 -1457.36 -1459.95
Wald 108.75 108.78 109.01 105.82
Prob 00 0 0
LR-test 0.1 0.1 0.15 0.11
Prob>chi2 0.75 0.76 0.7 0.74
Notes
1. ***, ** and * represent the significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
2. athrho is the inverse hyperbolic tangent of ρ: athrho=0.5*ln((1+ρ)/(1-ρ)),
    where ρis the correlation coefficient of the residuals of Eq. (1) and (5)
3. lnsigma is ln(σ), where σ is the standard error of the residual of Eq. (1).
4. LR-test is the Χ-square statistics of the null hypothesis that ρis zero.   
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Table 4B. Estimation Results for Medium-size Matured Firms  (Age>13 and No. of Workers>87)
12 3
EBITDA (t+1): Eq. (1)
EBITDA 0.462*** 0.462*** 0.462***
(20.08) (20.06) (20.07)
BUSINESS (t+1) 2.294*** 2.294*** 2.294***
(7.79) (7.79) (7.79)
SIZE 0.041 0.039 0.039
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
AGE -0.184 -0.184 -0.185
(0.53) (0.53) (0.53)
REJECT -3.203 -3.292 -3.302
(1.59) (1.61) (1.64)




DEBT 0.874* 0.851* 0.880*
(1.85) (1.79) (1.86)
EBITDA -0.035** -0.036** -0.034**
(2.14) (2.17) (2.07)
BUSINESS -0.292 -0.267 -0.292
(1.63) (1.48) (1.62)
SALES -0.117 -0.123 -0.119
(0.84) (0.89) (0.86)










RELATIONSHIP YEARS -0.342 -0.351 -0.352
(1.20) (1.23) (1.24)
NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS -0.323** -0.324** -0.322**
(2.55) (2.54) (2.55)
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 0.177 0.156 0.183
(0.59) (0.52) (0.61)
Constant 1.624 1.486 1.981
(1.16) (1.05) (1.37)
athrho -0.04 -0.033 -0.032
(0.30) (0.25) (0.25)
lnsigma 1.734*** 1.734*** 1.734***
(98.65) (98.67) (98.67)
No. of Observations 1620 1620 1620
Log Likelihood -5227.13 -5227.24 -5227.28
Wald 617.92 617.67 617.88
Prob 00 0
LR-test 0.08 0.05 0.05
Prob>chi2 0.78 0.82 0.82
Notes
1. ***, ** and * represent the significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
2. athrho is the inverse hyperbolic tangent of ρ: athrho=0.5*ln((1+ρ)/(1-ρ)),
    where ρis the correlation coefficient of the residuals of Eq. (1) and (5)
3. lnsigma is ln(σ), where σ is the standard error of the residual of Eq. (1).
4. LR-test is the Χ-square statistics of the null hypothesis that ρis zero. 
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Table 4C. Estimation Results for Small Matured Firms  (Age>13 and No. of Workers<=87)
12 3
EBITDA (t+1): Eq. (1)
EBITDA 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.451***
(32.49) (32.48) (32.47)
BUSINESS (t+1) 2.139*** 2.138*** 2.138***
(12.69) (12.68) (12.68)
SIZE 0.281** 0.279** 0.280**
(2.28) (2.27) (2.27)
AGE -1.006*** -1.007*** -1.006***
(5.17) (5.17) (5.17)
REJECT 1.127* 1.057* 1.059*
(1.81) (1.69) (1.69)




DEBT 0.910*** 0.919*** 0.912***
(5.81) (5.85) (5.82)
EBITDA -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(4.29) (4.14) (4.15)
BUSINESS -0.300*** -0.300*** -0.300***
(4.08) (4.10) (4.09)
SALES -0.113** -0.116** -0.112**
(2.39) (2.45) (2.38)










RELATIONSHIP YEARS -0.161** -0.157** -0.152**
(2.53) (2.49) (2.39)
NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS 0.199** 0.193** 0.194**
(2.30) (2.24) (2.25)
Other Controls
COLLATERAL 0.446*** 0.428*** 0.424***
(3.08) (2.97) (2.95)
Constant -1.650*** -1.533*** -1.546***
(5.03) (4.55) (4.63)
athrho -0.125*** -0.119*** -0.119***
(3.24) (3.06) (3.06)
lnsigma 1.731*** 1.731*** 1.731***
(166.72) (166.78) (166.78)
No. of Observations 4687 4687 4687
Log Likelihood -15448.06 -15450.59 -15450.61
Wald 1615.82 1615.86 1615.94
Prob 0.00 0.00 0.00
LR-test 8.34 7.54 7.50
Prob>chi2 0.00 0.01 0.01
Notes
1. ***, ** and * represent the significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
2. athrho is the inverse hyperbolic tangent of ρ: athrho=0.5*ln((1+ρ)/(1-ρ)),
    where ρis the correlation coefficient of the residuals of Eq. (1) and (5)
3. lnsigma is ln(σ), where σ is the standard error of the residual of Eq. (1).
4. LR-test is the Χ-square statistics of the null hypothesis that ρis zero.  